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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tara Crist appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance. She asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion to withdraw 
her Alford1 plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Crist was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession 
of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.47.) She subsequently entered an Alford plea to 
possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.119.) At the sentencing hearing, counsel 
for Ms. Crist informed the court that there had been a breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship and that Ms. Crist wished to withdraw her plea. (R., p.156.) The district 
court permitted counsel to withdraw and appointed the public defender to represent 
Ms. Crist. (R., p.157 .) The court permitted Ms. Crist to file a motion to withdraw her 
plea and set a hearing date for that motion. (R., p.157.) 
Counsel for Ms. Crist then filed a motion to withdraw her plea on the basis that 
Ms. Crist no longer wished to accept the plea offer and wished to take the case to trial. 
(R., p.169.) Ms. Crist testified at the evidentiary hearing on her motion. She stated that 
on the day she entered her Alford plea, all she had been doing is "a lot of thinking and 
crying and fighting with my husband and - just because of the whole thing." (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.7-10.)2 She testified that she at the time she entered her plea, she was represented 
by a different attorney; she requested a new attorney because, "I didn't feel like he had 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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enough time for me for one. Every time we'd come to court he would always talk about 
where he had to be and - right after me, so I was pretty much taking up his time 
whether I pleaded guilty or not guilty." (Tr., p.7, Ls.20-24.) She also stated that he 
demanded an additional $5,000 to take her case to trial, which she did not have. 
(Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.2.) 
When asked why she was fighting with her husband, Ms. Crist stated, "[i]t's just 
that I've been emotionally unstable, just crying all the time, and he's - he'll want to do 
something, and I'd rather stay home or just -." (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-11.) They would fight 
about, "[e]verything you can think of, friends, family, kids." (Tr., p.8, Ls.18-19.) 
When her case was called, "I couldn't really talk to the judge. I was crying, and 
there was no contact between - no eye contact or nothing like that because I did not 
want to plead guilty at all." (Tr., p.9, Ls.4-7.) She felt sick that day, because, "when 
you're pleaded guilty to something that is not yours, you're going to feel sick. That's 
how I feel anyway. I still do." (Tr., p.9, Ls.16-18.) 
A recess had to be called when she entered her plea because she was unable to 
make it through the hearing the first time around. (Tr., p.9, Ls.19-25.) During this 
recess, she spoke to her attorney, and, "he was not willing to look beyond anything 
other than a state witness, and he didn't want to talk about anything else. I was wasting 
his time and - I mean, I sent for my paperwork from his office and still haven't received 
it." (Tr., p.10, Ls.8-15.) Ms. Crist testified that she had not pleaded voluntarily, 
because, 
Considering what I have been through in the past, I have a lot of time 
hanging over my head, so, therefore, like [her previous attorney] said, you 
2 There are several volumes of transcripts that have been prepared for this appeal. 
Unless otherwise noted, citations to the transcript in this brief are to the transcript of the 
August 16, 2010, hearing on the motion to withdraw Ms. Grist's plea. 
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know, hey, you can either go and do six months, nine months or whatever 
and then go 7 to 14 years if I was found guilty. So, therefore, I [felt] it 
would be better to take whatever is best, but I still didn't want to do it. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.14-21.) She further explained, 
I shouldn't have done it. I did not want to do it from the beginning, and I 
don't understand an Afford guilty plea. I still don't. I've read about it, and 
it's in the paper all the time, and I read it. I don't understand it. I don't 
think it should be legal because, like I told [prior counsel], I said, 'What if I 
take it and then they come back and tell me, 'he, well, we did fingerprints 
on this bag and they weren't yours,' so, therefore, I perjured myself and 
said it was?' And he says, 'Well, you've got a point there, but I don't think 
that's going to happen.' 
(Tr., p.12, L.17 - p.13, L.3.) Finally, Ms. Crist testified that she asked her attorney for 
fingerprints and an audio and video, and was never able to see anything. (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.6-10.) Further, when she first went to court, the prosecutor referenced a receipt, and 
she had never been able to see this alleged receipt. (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-17.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Crist agreed with the prosecutor that he 
recommended drug court as part of the agreement and that she like the option of drug 
court better than the risk of going to prison; however, she stated that she did not need 
drug court- she was taking it because that was the deal the prosecutor offered. 
(Tr., p.16, L.10 p .17, L.12.) Ms. Crist acknowledged that she was not accepted to drug 
court because she was late. (Tr., p.17, Ls.19-25.) When asked if she had a chance to 
review the presentence investigation report, she stated that she and her attorney met 
for about five minutes and that it was not because of the report that she was seeking to 
withdraw her plea. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-15.) She did acknowledge that she knew she was 
not going to be accepted into drug court when she moved to withdraw her plea. 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.17-19.) 
Shannon Taylor, a deputy with the Cassia County Sheriff's Office, testified that 
there was an outstanding warrant for Lisa Baxter and that, "she is not in custody. At 
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least not in our jail." (Tr., p.28, L4 - p.30, L.9.) The prosecutor then represented to the 
court that Ms. Baxter "is a very important witness, perhaps even a necessary witness. 
She had agreed to testify against Tara Crist, and I can provide the Court with 
documentation from her case if I need to." (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-9.) The prosecutor stated 
that, "where this is a constructive possession case and Ms. Baxter was driving the car 
that Tara Crist was a passenger in, then I think that that's - she's an important witness. 
There's prejudice to the state .... " (Tr., p.31, Ls.20-25.) 
Following this evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Ms. Grist's motion. 
(R., p.172; 176.) The court noted that Ms. Crist was "generally aware of a possibly 
more severe sanction based on not getting into drug court and not having that available 
when it came time for sentencing ... " (Tr., p.49, Ls.15-21.) However, the district court 
stated that it was not going to, "hold [the] review of the presentence investigation itself 
against Ms. Crist in this case" because there had been discussion of withdrawing the 
plea before Ms. Crist had reviewed the report. (Tr., p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.15.) 
The court concluded that Ms. Crist was fully aware of the consequences of this 
case, including the fact that she had a prior conviction. (Tr., p.50, Ls.16-24.) "She 
testified about the things that any rational defendant would look at ... " (Tr., p.50, Ls.22-
25.) The court noted that it was, "inherent that it's a difficult decision to decide to plead 
guilty to a felony when there may be defenses to it, there could be issues, and it is 
rational and the exact purpose of an Alford plea for a defendant to consider the benefits 
of taking the agreement versus the risks of going to trial." (Tr., p.50, Ls.4-9.) The court 
considered the fact that while Ms. Crist was very emotional at the entry of plea hearing, 
she was given the opportunity to speak to her attorney. (Tr., p.51, Ls.14-25.) 
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The court put little weight on the fact that there was an outstanding warrant on 
Ms. Baxter, concluding that there was no evidence that Ms. Crist was aware of the 
outstanding warrant, and that the State could still potentially find her and obtain the 
same testimony. (Tr., p.54, L.21 - p.55, L.12.) 
Finally, the court concluded, 
I'm aware it's an issue of discretion, reviewed the cases and some of the 
factors that we've discussed as well as the rule and noting that the burden 
is on the defendant to show a just reason for withdrawal of plea, the Court 
will deny the motion to withdraw plea. The plea was knowingly and 
intelligently made at the time. The defendant was given a chance for 
recesses, was given a chance to talk to attorneys, said she could review 
the discovery, had reviewed the discovery, had a chance to give drug 
court a try and was late. 
[ .. '] 
Regardless of what was the PSI or [her attorney] may have said, she 
knew the consequences. So it's similar to those cases where a defendant 
is just trying to weigh the consequences and got the benefit of the plea, 
put the state at a disadvantage thereby, which is, again, hard to weigh 
exactly what the disadvantage may or may not be because you never 
know exactly what a codefendant's testimony is going to be, but light of all 
that, the motion to withdraw the plea is denied. 
(Tr., p.57, L.17 - p.58, L.20.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with three years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.188; 190.) 
Ms. Crist appealed. (R., p.202.) She asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
by denying her motion to withdraw her Alford plea. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Grist's motion to withdraw 
her Alford plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Grist's Motion To Withdraw 
Her Alford Plea 
A. Introduction 
After she entered her Alford plea, but prior to sentencing, Ms. Crist moved to 
withdraw her plea. The district court denied Ms. Grist's motion. Ms. Crist asserts that 
the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw his Alford plea. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Grist's Motion To 
Withdraw Her Alford Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is generally governed by the provisions of 
I.C.R. 33(c), which provides that such a motion, "may be made only before sentence is 
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the 
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant 
to withdraw the defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). The district court's decision whether to 
grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his or her guilty plea is reviewed on appeal for 
an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008). However, 
the district court must act within the proper bounds of that discretion and consistent with 
the legal standards that are applicable to its determination. State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 
836, 839 (Ct. App. 2001). 
The district court should liberally apply its discretion when presented with a 
motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea prior to sentencing. Arthur, 145 Idaho at 
222. When evaluating a claim that the trial court has abused its discretion, the 
sequence of inquiry is: first, whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; second, whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of 
7 
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and finally, whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991 ). 
The legal standards governing the district court's review of a defendant's motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea depend upon the timing of the defendant's motion. Id. When 
the defendant makes the motion prior to sentencing, he or she need only show "just 
cause" to withdraw the plea. Id. Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the court and 
prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared to protecting 
the right of the accused to trial by jury. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530 (Ct. App. 
2008). A district court may deny such a motion where the defendant fails to present and 
support a plausible reason for the withdrawal. State v. Wyatt, 131 Idaho 95, 97 
(Ct. App. 1998). Denial is also proper where the state demonstrates that it would be 
prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. 
Additionally, special considerations are permitted when the defendant's motion to 
withdraw comes before sentencing, but after the defendant has had the opportunity to 
review the content of the presentence investigation report. In such cases, the district 
court "may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 
145 Idaho at 222. 
In contrast, a much stricter standard applies when the defendant moves to 
withdraw his or her guilty plea after sentencing. In such cases, a defendant must 
demonstrate manifest injustice in order to be entitled to a withdrawal of the plea. 
State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 859 (Ct. App. 2007). Manifest injustice is established if 
the plea was not taken in compliance with the due process requirements that the plea 
be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. 
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While the first step in analyzing a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
to examine whether the plea is constitutionally valid, this is not the last or necessarily 
dispositive analysis when the defendant's motion is made prior to sentencing. State v. 
Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). Even if the plea itself is constitutionally 
valid, the district court is required to consider whether the reasons for seeking 
withdrawal of the guilty plea meet the lesser standard of just cause. Id. 
Ms. Crist agrees with the district court that the proper standard to apply is the just 
cause standard where a defendant has not reviewed the presentence investigation 
report. (See Tr., p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.15.) While Ms. Crist agrees that the district court 
perceived the issue as one of discretion and applied the proper legal standard, she 
respectfully asserts that the district court did not reach its conclusion through an 
exercise of reason. 
While it is true that Ms. Crist knew that she would not be accepted into drug court 
at the time she moved to withdraw her guilty plea, there is no evidence that this was the 
reason she moved to withdraw her guilty plea. Ms. Crist specifically asserted, and 
testified, that she was moving to withdraw her guilty plea on the basis that she was not 
guilty of the instant crime and that she felt pressured to enter a plea at the change of 
plea hearing. (See, e.g., Tr., p.9, Ls.16-18.) And while the district court was correct 
that Ms. Crist was afforded additional time to discuss the case with her attorney at the 
change of plea hearing, Ms. Crist specifically testified that her attorney still pressured 
her to enter her plea during the recess. (Tr., p.10, Ls.8-15.) 
Ms. Crist established just cause despite the fact that she knew she would not be 
accepted to drug court and had additional time to discuss the case with her attorney. 
The record is clear that Ms. Crist felt pressure to plead guilty based on the emotional 
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turmoil in her life and the fact that her attorney led her to believe she was interfering 
with his time and wanted her to plead guilty. 
Further, the State's assertion that it would be prejudiced was hardly convincing. 
The State only presented evidence that there was an outstanding warrant for 
Ms. Baxter. (Tr., p.30, Ls.10-13.) There was no representation made regarding the 
State's attempts to contact Ms. Baxter, there was simply the assertion the State did not 
know where she was. (Tr., p.31, Ls.10-19) And as the district court noted, it was still 
very possible that the State would be able to locate Ms. Baxter prior to any trial in this 
case. (Tr., p.54, L.21 - p.55, L.12.) 
Ms. Crist asserts that, due to her mental state and the fact that her attorney had 
pressured her into entering her plea, she establish just cause to withdraw her plea and 
that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw her Alford 
plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Crist requests that the district court's order denying her motion to withdraw 
her Alford plea be reversed, that her conviction be vacated, and that her case be 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of November, 2011. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State' Appellate Public Defender 
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